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ABSTRACT

American attitudes toward foreign aid for population control have changed dramatically since the period following World War II, when birth control assistance was considered too controversial for government funding. With growing national and international concern about population growth and poverty in the developing nations and through the efforts of private groups such as the Population Council, the government began to fund birth control programs in the 1960's. The focus on reducing birth rates in poor countries led to excessively optimistic hopes for such programs as well as sometimes simplistic arguments focusing on the relative cost of preventing pregnancy. Poor people were not always as eager to embrace population control as were development experts. A backlash against population control programs emerged at the Bucharest Conference in 1974 with the slogan, "Development is the best contraceptive." Two main tasks now face agencies involved in family planning. Americans must overcome the new attitude that both the United States and poorer countries would be better off if the U.S. provided less assistance. And if the U.S. does provide assistance, some difficult questions must be considered about how these resources can be applied so they go to those with the greatest need. (IS)

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INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN THE POPULATION FIELD: ROADS TAKEN, PATHS AHEAD

BY GEORGE ZEIDENSTEIN

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Mr. George Zeidenstein is President of the Population Council.

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INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN THE POPULATION FIELD: ROADS TAKEN, PATHS AHEAD

By
George Zeidenstein

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Introduction

It is an honor to be giving this year's Thomas Robert Malthus Memorial Lecture, and I can't help noting how appropriate it is that this influential Englishman, one of the founders of classical economic theory, should be memorialized at an American university. When Malthus propounded his powerful ideas on population, England stood poised on the threshold of a century of triumphant expansion and world leadership; and America was just a shaky fledgling republic testing the new waters of representative government. Since the Second World War, leadership of the West has shifted to the United States and the warnings of Malthus, like the principles of his contemporary Adam Smith, are central elements of the global concerns that radiate from this country. As of this moment in the Spring of 1981, Americans have come to some sort of juncture (not well defined yet) in their relations with the world and are reexamining what, if anything, they should be doing to assist the sustained development of poorer countries.

Today, I will begin with some observations on how the United States arrived at its present position and, particularly, how its understanding of population and development questions has evolved since the Second World War. Then, in the second part of this talk, I would like to offer some speculations about the tasks that confront us in the 1980s. To avoid excessive detail and complexity in so brief a talk, I must rely somewhat on aggregated global statistics, but I want to emphasize and caution at the outset that such statistics can be misleading. They reflect some important realities, but they also conceal critical differences that exist among nations and no less crucial ones that exist within nations, between various classes, and other categories of people. These differences are vast and deep. They encompass many characteristics including, for example, social, cultural, economic, and demographic ones.

The Emergence of the U.S. as a World Power

History books tell us that the prominence of the United States as a world power has just about coincided with the 20th century. By sending missionaries and explorers to Africa and Asia, our country had helped to spread Western culture before 1900, but it was the Spanish-American War — and the takeover of the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico — that established the United States on the international scene. When America entered the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson gave the conflict a moral purpose, putting forward the principles of self-determination that all peoples have since claimed as their right. As we know, Congress did not accept for the country the expanded international role that Wilson brought back from Versailles, but the Second World War largely vindicated his ideas. That war saw America and her allies victorious over the major powers in two hemispheres. A new world organization, the United Nations, was created with headquarters in America's largest city. And with the Marshall Plan for Europe and President Truman's Point Four program for the rest of the world, the United States set out to guide and assist economic and social development on a global scale. When Congress in 1950 passed the Act for International Development, opening the way for practical application of the Point Four declaration in Truman's 1949 Inaugural Address, it adopted the following official statement of motives:

> The peoples of the United States and other nations have a common interest in the freedom and in the economic and social progress of all peoples. Such progress can further the secure growth of democratic ways of life, the expansion of mutually beneficial commerce, the development of international understanding and good will, and the maintenance of world peace.[1]

As it happens, this period of American leadership since the Second World War has coincided with the highest rates of population growth in human history. For most of the past, the earth's population had not increased by more than half a percent or so annually. By the 1940s, thanks to sharp improvements in health and living conditions, the average rate of growth had risen to slightly more than 1.16 percent annually. In the 1950s, it reached 1.86 percent. In the 1960s, it was still climbing: 1.95 percent. Finally, in the 1970s, it showed a slight deceleration, to 1.83 percent. But that rate is still far higher than it ever was in premodern times. The number of people added to the world since 1949 — the year of Truman's declaration of Point Four — is 1.9 billion, a number that is nearly half a billion more than the entire population of the world existing at the start of the 20th century. The growth has been particularly rapid in the lower income countries — also known, with certain variations in groupings, as the "less developed countries," the "developing countries," the "Third World" (the "First" one being the capitalist group and the "Second," the communist), and the "South." These countries now have about three-fourths of the world's people and during much of the period since 1950 their average growth rate has been above two percent annually, while the richer countries — the North — on the whole have grown at less than one percent annually.[2]

Obviously, Malthus has relevance to this situation and the very fact that we can speak of growth rates remaining close to two percent proves one half of his famous proposition — that population tends to increase geometrically. The other half — that food can increase only arithmetically — has not fared so well though there is little ground for comfort. If all the food produced in the world were divided equally among all the people living in it, each person's share would have increased since 1950 — by as much as a quarter according to figures of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.[3] Thus, global food production has also grown geometrically, as Malthus said it could not. But that same Food and Agriculture Organization also tells us that in the lower income countries, with their three-fourths of the world's population, the average consumption of calories still falls short of the minimum required for normal health in adults and normal growth and intelligence in children. Among large disadvantaged groups within these countries, the average diet falls much further short of the minimum.[4] This pervasive malnutrition and all the suffering into which it translates could serve as a definition of the "check" on population that Malthus called "misery."

The relationship between demographic change and food production over time is a complex matter, one that involves the entire socioeconomic structure. Succinctly put, the Malthusian heritage is a general concern that population growth will strain the supplies of food and other resources. At the start of the postwar period, even before population growth rates reached their peaks, some American scientists felt that concern regarding the more densely populated poorer countries, and there were a few American citizens with a sufficiently far-reaching sense of responsibility to do something about it. Some of the attitudes of those years can be seen in the summary report of the population conference that John D. Rockefeller 3rd organized in June 1952 at Williamsburg, Virginia. Rockefeller had perceived years before the Second World War that population growth might involve serious problems and he became one of the first Americans to be committed to understanding and working in the population field. He invited about 30 leading social and biological scientists to Williamsburg. Their summary report was republished recently in the Population Council's journal *Population and Development Review,* and it provides a remarkable sounding of themes that were to recur through the nearly 30 years since.[5]

The scientists at Williamsburg agreed that "the prospect of rapid population growth poses serious problems in many countries." In the short term there was a challenge of increasing production of food and other goods, but in the longer term it would be necessary to lower birth rates. It was feared that within a few years the situation might get very serious indeed. The problems facing India seemed especially pressing. The 1952 conferees spoke of the sensitive cultural factors involved in demographic change, and one person cautioned that the meeting reflected only a "Western Protestant" point of view. There was discussion of whether poor countries should emphasize urban industrialization or rural agriculture, and of the likely demographic impacts of either strategy. Even the possibility of using solar energy for food production was mentioned. The conference saw a need for much more research regarding reproduction and contra-

ception. It pondered the potentials and the limits of technological transformation, and observed that "solutions to questions of population involve ultimately not only matters of physical and material well being, but also those of a cultural, moral and spiritual nature."

The Population Council

A direct result of the Williamsburg conference was the formation of the Population Council, the first research and training organization devoted to all aspects of population. John Rockefeller and the other philanthropists who entered the field at that time — 1952 — had the freedom of private citizens, but official bodies were at first reluctant (to say the least) to become involved. That same year, for example, when a Norwegian delegate to the World Health Organization proposed that it study the health aspects of the world population problem, including birth control, the delegates from several Roman Catholic countries said that this would jeopardize the organization's very existence, and the proposal was dropped. The Catholic hierarchy's condemnation of contraception — and particularly of abortion — has, of course, remained a major fact of the postwar period, and it was probably the main reason that the American government avoided direct involvement with international population assistance until 1965. In 1959, President Eisenhower had said: "I cannot imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or governmental activity or function or responsibility."[4] On the other hand, President Kennedy's ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, tells of an interesting incident that occurred in 1962 when Mrs. Kennedy was visiting that country. She was greeted by a huge mass of schoolchildren let out in her honor and was more appalled than anything else. She said to Galbraith, "I hope the fact that we're Catholic isn't keeping anyone [meaning any American] from advocating birth control."

Birth control is indeed a delicate subject. It is as personal and private a matter as it is a matter of national, international, and global consequence. No amount of careful expression about "cultural, moral and spiritual" aspects nor rooting of the concern in considerations of individual well-being has ever managed to remove it entirely from the realm of ideological polemics. Malthus himself was a fairly typical Anglican of his time and found contraception to be morally unthinkable; he advocated only celibacy — or "moral restraint" as he put it — as a solution to the problem. Later, there grew up a tiny movement of agitators who called themselves Neo-Malthusians because they shared his worries about population growth but not his objections to contraception. Meanwhile, descending from Marx, who detested Malthus for his middle-class moralizing and economics, there developed a strain of doctrinaire hostility to the idea that the fertility of poor people is in itself a public problem. One more quotation from 1952 is illustrative. In November, *Pravda* published an article titled "Deeds and Designs of American Neo-Malthusians," attacking the "infamous theory of the earth's 'overpopulation'." It accused the birth-control advocate Margaret Sanger and her sympathizers of having designs on "the densely populated countries in Asia and the Far East, considering them testing grounds for their inhuman experiments.... A direct link exists between human sterilization, the lynching of

Negroes and the waging of germ warfare in Korea. All these reflect the cannibalistic policy of the American pretenders to world domination."[8]

The tone of this propaganda may seem dated, a sign of the Cold War of that time. But to this day, support for family planning programs plays no part in Soviet foreign aid. In the Soviet view there are no overpopulated countries, only victims of imperialism. The irony is that within their own borders the Soviets have broken new ground in providing the contraceptive means for family planning as a social service and they have kept a close watch on their own demographic trends. Last year they showed their concern over low birth rates among the Russians of the U.S.S.R., and their sense that the private decisions that produce those birth rates are indeed appropriate subjects of public policy, by banning women from heavy or dangerous occupations and by publishing articles glorifying motherhood and marriage.[9] Meanwhile, other nations in the Marxist or socialist tradition — China being the most notable Asian example — have been positively aggressive in promoting smaller families among their people.

One needn't have heard of Malthus to grasp the political implications of rapid multiplication of the poor. Somewhere I've read that at one point in the American Revolution, Benjamin Franklin sat down and calculated that during the campaign in which 150 Americans died on Bunker Hill, 60,000 others were being born. Similar calculations since then have given comfort to countless other revolutionaries, and have troubled conservative defenders of the *status quo*. In the present age, the leading conservative voice is ours, the United States, a nation that promotes social and economic development as a preferred alternative to revolution. That rationale has been evident in official American foreign aid ever since the Marshall Plan and Point Four. And at least since an American Secretary of State offered the threat of "one billion" Chinese as a reason for drawing the line in southeast Asia, the growth of massive hungry populations has figured critically in the political consciousness of our country.

Of course, there can be convergence, to use a now fashionable word, between the political and the humanitarian points of view. Secretaries of State are supposed to think politically; on the other hand, John Rockefeller exemplified the humanitarian point of view. As he said reviewing 40 years of his past at the historic 1974 Population Tribune in Bucharest, Romania:

> It is a long distance from 1934 when birth control was not a topic for polite conversation to this first population conference of governments. Against this background, perhaps you can understand my satisfaction in being asked to speak here and to share in this demonstration of global awareness and concern.
>
> In that span of 40 years there have been two convictions on which I have never altered my view. One was stated in the 1934 letter to my father — that the population problem is "fundamental and underlying," absolutely critical to the well-being and future of the human race. The other is that our objective is the enrichment of human life, not its restriction. There is only one reason for concerning ourselves about population — to improve the quality of people's lives, to help make it possible for individuals everywhere to develop their full potential.[10]

Rockefeller established the Population Council because he thought that such an unofficial and international "organization at a high level of professional competence and public esteem"[11] could help in significant ways toward that end. In the 1960s, the Council had cause to be satisfied as the concern about growing population finally began spreading to the public and to leaders in Northern countries and many Southern countries as well. A milestone came in 1966 when Mr. Rockefeller persuaded 30 world leaders to subscribe to his Statement on Population, calling the opportunity to decide the number and spacing of children a basic human right.[12] The population problem was one on which the interests of politicians, scientists, and humanitarians from a variety of nations could converge. Programs to provide family planning services and information, as well as expertise in demography and economics, sprouted in a number of less developed countries. The Population Council became an international organization — international in staff, trustees, and sources of finance. Always hoping for convergence — indeed seeking it between political and humanitarian interests, Northern and Southern interests — the publications of the Council address what we call "the international community."

In one respect the field of international population activities may have been too successful in establishing itself. The focus on reducing birth rates led to what proved to be excessively optimistic hopes for family planning programs and to sometimes simplistic arguments in their favor. By adding up the costs of contraception in one column and the costs of raising a child in another, one could make the claim that just a few dollars invested in family planning programs would save hundreds of dollars needed for the bare survival of an extra child. The logic of such a calculation had a great appeal and in 1965 President Lyndon Johnson said to a United Nations audience: "Let us act on the fact, that less than five dollars invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars invested in economic growth."[13] To some people, family planning programs were seen as the bargains of the Development Decade, the 1960s.

But poor people in traditional countries often seemed to be making a different calculation. In their views, it seemed, additional children were not so much mouths to feed as hands and eyes that could help even at an early age. The net flow of goods and services in poor traditional countries is probably from the young to the mature — the reverse of what it is in rich countries. The flow is likely to be reversible only by a multifaceted transformation of people's lives. At a time when aid in general was not forthcoming at the levels promised, the simplistic economic argument for support of family planning programs inevitably aroused the sensitivities of recipient nations, suggesting that we wanted to buy them off as cheaply as possible. A backlash was probably unavoidable. It came at the World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974.

The Bucharest Conference

What happened at the Bucharest Conference has of course been described in detail by many commentators[14] and I need not repeat their points here. Bucharest belongs to an era of international dialogue that began in 1971, when the newly

independent nations of the Third World attained the numbers sufficient to seat the Peking government at the United Nations. Since then, especially encouraged by the 1973 demonstration of the power of oil-exporting countries amongst them, the Third World has been seeking to translate its voting strength at international forums into real gains in political relations and trade. In a recent review of this long decade of debate, the British economist Barbara Ward asks rhetorically what has been accomplished, and answers, "Nothing."[15] The Third World has made its demands and aired its grievances, and the official North has said that it cannot give away something for nothing. In this climate the hope for an effective international community with common aims, or that nations might see beyond their important differences to convergent interests as co-inhabitants of a single planet, has become thin indeed and the rhetorical confrontations persist. Bucharest in 1974 was one of the events in that political unfolding.

For many American population specialists, the Bucharest Conference was distressing because it seemed to undo years of work. Having labored to win recognition for the population problem, they had led the advance drafting of a World Plan of Action, only to see Third World political delegates take over from their own professional staffs and use the occasion for downgrading population and advocating a New International Economic Order. The speech of the Chinese delegate set the tone:

> ... (T)he primary way of solving the population problem lies in combating the aggression and plunder of the imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists, and particularly the superpowers, breaking down the unequal international economic relations, winning and safeguarding national independence, and developing the national economy and culture independently and self-reliantly in the light of each country's specific conditions and differing circumstances and raising the living standards of the people.[16]

A less belligerant slogan of the occasion went: "Development is the best contraceptive," meaning that economic growth would bring down birth rates (rather than lower birth rates improving prospects for economic growth).

Despite its 1974 rhetoric, China has had an aggressive program to limit population growth and more recently, under rhetoric of entirely a different color, it has sought the help of the international community, particularly the financial help of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities. China has sought international scientific help as well. For example, five post-doctoral fellows from the People's Republic are now in residence at the Population Council's biomedical laboratories. In other Southern countries, too, the concern about population growth has only deepened since Bucharest.

By being so politicized, the conference seemed to direct attention away from population, but ultimately it may have helped by underscoring the truth that the fertility of a country reflects its socioeconomic structure and therefore is generally resistant to manipulation solely through compartmentalized family planning programs. John Rockefeller stated the matter in personal and moving terms in his 1974 speech to the Tribunal at Bucharest:

For many years a sense of urgency caused me to concentrate on the family planning approach. It was generally recognized in those days that industrialization led to low birth rates, but there were few countries that had the capital and the resources to industrialize, certainly to do so quickly. Family planning seemed simpler and more direct. It would save time and be relatively low in cost. And pilot projects in different parts of the world indicated women wanted such assistance.

Yet, the evidence has been mounting, particularly in the past decade, to indicate that family planning alone is not adequate. It turns out that women who avail themselves of family planning are chiefly those who already have had many children. Over the 40-year span I have referred to, the population of the world has increased by 86 percent, from 2.1 billion to 3.9 billion. And the absolute number of people in poverty has continued to grow. Clearly, the programs that have been undertaken have proved inadequate when compared to the magnitude of the problems facing us.

With this background very much in mind, I come to Bucharest with an urgent call for a deep and probing reappraisal of all that has been done in the population field, all that has been learned, so that the years ahead may yield the results mankind so desperately wants."

The population field has grown more universally aware of the many aspects of development policy that can impinge on population. Reducing infant and child mortality, expanding basic education, increasing the productivity of small farmers, distributing the benefits of economic growth and, what might be called the hub of this wheel of social and economic objectives, raising the status and participation of women — all these are desirable not only in themselves but also in their favorable impacts on fertility. Furthermore, where governments supply social services they are in a stronger position to offer incentives for smaller families.[9] Population specialists today appreciate this complexity of possible approaches.

Unfortunately, the awareness is not reciprocated in the other development sectors and we in the population field have had to struggle not merely to maintain our own sector but — with even more difficulty and frustration — to spread our demographic-based human concerns to economists, agriculturalists, health professionals, educators, and other development specialists. I personally have been unsuccessful thus far in securing establishment of a postgraduate program in development with a demographic perspective. For perfectly sound reasons of disciplinary and budgetary integrity the broad field of international economic and social development is divided into sectors such as education, agriculture, rural development, health, and population. The problem so far as introducing population elements into all of them is one of excessive insularity — bureaucratic and professional self-interest. Yet, there is a growing need to integrate population and development strategies, as well as a growing demand for family planning program services especially along with primary health care services or maternal and child health care services.

The Present Outlook

These few observations on the postwar period bring me to the present moment and the outlook for the coming years and decades. There seem to be two main tasks before us. First, we have to overcome some new tendencies toward indifference, complacency, and short-sightedness regarding the poorer countries — new claims that both we and they might be better off if we provided less assistance. Second, assuming we reaffirm our commitment to these countries, we must participate in considering some difficult questions about how resources can best be applied to the serious and growing economic and social gaps that exist between groups within their borders.

Let me begin by once again setting the scene in terms of population projections. The slight decline in annual growth rates that appeared in the past decade and a half is expected to continue and not to be reversed. In absolute numbers population will nevertheless go on increasing by enormous numbers each year. The question is how quickly fertility rates will fall to the replacement level — as they eventually must, since population cannot increase forever. The latest projections, based on 1975 to 1980 data, put the prospects of stabilization a bit further into the future than they used to be. If by some global miracle the world were to lower its fertility to the replacement level in the next three or four years, its population at the turn of the century would be only about 5.3 billion, a billion more than it is now. If, as is more likely, replacement level fertility is not reached until around the years 2040 or 2045, the population in 2000 will be about 6.4 billion — two billion more than it is now. In that case, population will not begin to stabilize until 15 or 20 years into the next century when it will be between 13 and 14 billion — which is 9 or 10 billion more than now! In all of these cases, population growth will remain especially pronounced in the poorer countries because, compared to the other countries, they have very young age structures: that is, large proportions of their people are and will be in the childbearing years, and this creates a heavy momentum for growth which will continue. If these poorer countries do not lower their fertility to replacement level until 2040 or 2045, their population in 2000 is likely to be about 5.1 billion, or five-sixths of the world's total at that time and nearly a billion more than the present population of this entire planet.[19]

Trends such as these periodically give rise to warnings of a population "bomb" or "explosion." Both of these dramatic terms are unfortunate, because they imply some sort of visible, large-scale cataclysm and the public's fascination with that possibility turns too easily from helpless fear into forgetful indifference when the worst is not seen to occur. Then there is likely to be an eye-catching announcement of an "end" to the population explosion, which is just as misleading.[20] The fact is that if one were to count up all the needless deaths caused each year by poverty — deaths that could be avoided with feasible improvements in living conditions — one would have more than enough to justify comparisons with a nuclear holocaust. But that simple truth is nothing more than a numbing fact; there need to be hopeful reasons for remaining involved with the poorest countries, and certainly for attempting to help them build a productive, self-sustaining future.

Our numbness, our indifference, tends of course to become more substantial when the seeming intractability of a country's poverty is combined, as it often is,

with anti-American rhetoric. Then Americans wonder why they should be providing any aid at all, a question heard more and more today. Intellectual support for the question has come from certain thinkers who would like to extend laissez-faire principles to all international and social relations. These voices argue that international assistance diverts funds from fruitful private investment and distorts capital markets. They say that the United States and other Northern countries grew and flourished without foreign aid, so why can't, say, South Asia and Africa? Examples of unusually rapid economic growth, such as Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea, are held up as evidence of the soundness of capitalism and free enterprise, almost as if these countries would have done even better if they had received no economic aid at all. Meanwhile, military aid and protection for these countries is often described as urgently needed not only to ensure United States security but also the continued progress of the countries assisted. And to sharpen the political purpose still more, it is argued that a large amount of the economic assistance that is given elsewhere should be shifted from untrustworthy multilateral channels like the World Bank and the United Nations to direct, made-in-America bilateral channels.

In the social context, laissez-faire implies that no government — and certainly no foreign "expert" — has any business telling a parent how many children to have. The argument holds that society (that is, government) cannot make a better judgment about its demographic interests than the sum of families choosing freely according to their own calculations. If people want more children, the argument goes, let them have more children. They know what they're doing, and they don't need American advice or assistance.[21]

I don't think I have caricatured this line of thought. Its influence can be seen in our foreign development assistance budgets, which have been decreasing as a percentage of America's gross national product since the early 1960s, from 0.5 percent then to 0.2 percent now, have not been increased enough to keep up with inflation since 1979 and are threatened with further cuts by the new administration. Thirty years after it pulled the world along like a great locomotive, American foreign aid as a proportion of gross national product is now smaller than the aid of almost every other industrial democracy. Japan, in contrast, has not only been gaining ground on us in economic stature but has just announced its intention to double its foreign aid budget. In so doing the Japanese explicitly conceive of aid as an alternative to additional spending on their military establishment.

That strikes me as a wise conception in terms of both purpose and priority. The South now buys about a third of America's exports. By one estimate,[22] every dollar we invest in the World Bank stimulates ten dollars in United States exports. The involvement of the entire international community with the less developed countries is essential to the health of the North's economies. And we must remember that perhaps the most widely traveled American export of all is our credo of democracy and prosperity: if we keep our wealth too much to ourselves, or share it only with a few "models" of developing free enterprise, our way of life may ultimately be endangered. This is not a moralistic judgment — quite the contrary, I offer it as an antidote to a moralistic misassessment of democratic interests.

Assume, then, that the international community and especially its American members renew their commitment to the South. What problems do they confront? The outstanding feature of the landscape, it seems to me, is the tremendous disparity that exists within the poorest countries. The gaps between rather well-off upper crusts and the great masses of the dispossessed is as large or larger in relative terms as the gaps between the Northern countries and the Southern ones — and like those gaps, may widen in the future. The gap, I should explain, is not between urban industrialists and rural farmers; it is between a relatively modern sector in both city and countryside and a traditional layer of much lower productivity in both settings. Gains by the modern sector are of course essential for rapid economic progress. But these gains are often painful as, for example, when traditional labor opportunities for landless farm workers are eliminated and their migration to shantytowns is encouraged. Rapid demographic growth exacerbates the problem, adding to an underemployed labor pool faster than can be absorbed in the modern sector.[23]

It is part of conventional history that a similar contrast in wealth existed within the United States while it was industrializing in the last century. But that was then. The questions now are whether countries like India and Mexico will advance best by repeating the hard and lengthy 19th century experiences of the Northern countries and whether development policy should tolerate or seek to close the gaps. Under a regime of global laissez-faire, the answer is obvious: what funds are available will tend to go to the most modern sectors and the most modern countries, producing benefits that will flow on — or trickle down — to the others. I would like to speculate that it should not be necessary to choose between these two exclusive paths: it should be possible both to enhance incentives for investment in the productive modern sector and to improve the lot of the poor majority. To help the latter is to create markets for the former. Simultaneously, as people's lives begin to improve, their familial goals will change and they will turn more to modern contraception, which it is only humane to provide. If Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea are taken as models, then vigorous population programs, including the provision of contraceptive services, are necessary ingredients of the development formula.

A number of particular questions arise here, and I will mention just one. While fertility is intimately and ultimately related to the socioeconomic structure, it responds primarily to only four intermediate variables: the proportions of women married, the prevalence of contraception, the incidence of induced abortion, and the extent of breastfeeding. The levels of all four intermediate variables may change as society develops, but breastfeeding poses especially subtle problems. It is a healthful practice for mothers and babies and it increases the interval between births, but as women move to cities, take up work outside the household, and otherwise encounter modern opportunities, they have been likely to breastfeed less. At the same time, according to evidence from Africa, the uptake of contraception may not coincide. Thus women who were protected from pregnancy by breastfeeding are exposed to pregnancy when they give up breastfeeding and don't contracept. Promoting "old-fashioned" breastfeeding at the same time as "modern" contraceptive methods is a challenge. Preserving the benefits of a tradition like breastfeeding is a difficult matter in the early stages of modernization.

In a sense, the role of breastfeeding is a fine point, and contemplating it may appear to be almost an academic luxury in the context of massive poverty and long-term rapid population growth. It is difficult to tell just how humanity will surmount the growing imbalance between people and resources in the Southern countries. The most detailed recent estimate of possibilities for the next two decades is *The Global 2000 Report to the President,* which was prepared by government staff and published last year, and to which I was a consultant. *The Global 2000 Report* reaches a Malthusian and widely quoted conclusion: "If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now."[34] But this conclusion is based on admittedly flawed global aggregates, and the "if" of the "present trends" is a very big if. I am more hopeful. I think that despite the drag of rapid population growth the South will be able to raise its standard of living. But for it to succeed, the North will have to intervene cooperatively by stimulating the modernizing sectors at the same time that material assistance is provided to raise the productivity and well-being of the impoverished traditional majorities.

This brings me back to my basic stance: we of the Northern countries and especially we of the United States, leader of the Northern countries, must not turn away from the South. We must renew that international commitment and leadership which America assumed in World War II. A faltering response now to basic long-term problems will make necessary later two other kinds of approaches: either a fire-brigade rush to deal with some new outbreak of violence, or a soup-kitchen dispensary for yet another famished mass. Neither of these approaches is fulfilling or worthy of a great nation like ours — yet both seem to be pathetically more common, as refugees and immigrants press on our borders and shores, and the uprooted seek help in Africa and Indochina. The only way to reduce the magnitude of such extreme problems in the future is to sustain and build on the fundamental work of the past 30 years.

NOTES

1. As quoted in *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries,* by Eugene Staley, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1954, p. 32.

2. These figures are from Thomas Frejka, Associate, Center for Policy Studies, Population Council.

3. See ' Resources, Population, Environment: An Oversupply of False Bad News," by Julian L. Simon, in *Science,* Vol. 208, 27 June 1980, pp. 1431-1437.

4. See *The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century,* a report prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State, 1980, Vol. 1, p. 17.

5. See *Population and Development Review,* Vol. 4, No. 3, September 1978.

6. As quoted in *The New York Times,* 3 December 1959.

7. See *The Nature of Mass Poverty,* by John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1979, p. 38.

8. As quoted by Eugene Staley, *op. cit.,* p. 150.

9. See "Over-burdened Soviet women are relieved of heavy jobs," by Michael Binyon, *The London Times,* 30 December 1980.

10. *PDR* (September 1978), pp. 510-11.

11. From the Williamsburg Conference on Population Problems (June 1952): Summary Report, as reprinted in *Population and Development Review,* Vol. 3, No. 4, December 1977, p. 500.

12. On Human Rights Day, 10 December 1966, the Secretary-General of the United Nations circulated the Statement on Population signed by Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, President of Colombia; Dr. D. Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland; Mrs. Indiri Gandhi, Prime Minister of India; General Chung Hee Park, President of the Republic of Korea; Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaysia; King Hassan II of Morroco; King Mahendra of Nepal; Lee Kwan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore; Tage Erlander, Prime Minister of Sweden; Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic; Habib Bourguiba, President of Tunisia, and Marshal Josip Broz-Tito, President of Yugoslavia.

13. From an address delivered 25 June 1965 in San Francisco at a meeting commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the United Nations charter. Quoted in J. Mayone Stycos, *Ideology, Faith, and Family Planning in Latin America: Studies in Public and Private Opinion on Fertility Control,* McGraw-Hill, New York, 1971, p. 19.

14. E.g., *PDR* (September 1978) and *Studies in Family Planning,* Vol. 5, No. 12, December 1974.

15. "Last Chance for the North?", *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1980.

16. Population Tribune in Bucharest, Romania, August 1974, from speech of Chinese delegate [texts of speeches published in the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) Lecture Series on population].

17. As printed in *PDR* (September 1978), p. 511.

18. See my paper, "Strategic Issues in Population," *Population and Development Review,* Vol. 3, No. 3, September 1977.

19. Thomas Frejka, *op. cit.*

20. See "Notes and Commentary," *Population and Development Review,* Vol. 5, No. 3, September 1979.

21. See, for example, "The International Politics of Contraception," by Jacqueline Kasun, *Policy Review,* Winter 1981.

22. From *The New York Times* editorial, 4 February 1981, p. A22.

23. For a fuller discussion of this question, see "The North-South Income Gap: A Demographic Perspective," by Paul Demeny, a Center for Policy Studies Working Paper, The Population Council, January 1981.

24. *The Global 2000 Report..., op. cit.*

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